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Book Review 
Claire Pagès, Lyotard et l’aliénation (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2011), 160 pp. 
The concept of alienation took a considerable beating from various quarters 
in French philosophy from the 1960s to the 1980s. In this light, by mounting 
a radical Freudo-Nietzschean attack on alienation during the mid-1970s, 
Jean-François Lyotard did not particularly stand out among his peers. His 
originality vis-à-vis the concept, however, was nonetheless striking and 
twofold. First, he arrived at his uncompromising rejection only after having 
previously defended alienation tenaciously against no less a philosophical 
rival than leading French Marxist Louis Althusser. What is more, said 
radical rejection gave way in his later writings to a renewed, if nearly 
unrecognizable concept of alienation which, while no longer strictly 
speaking a critical concept, was nonetheless to play a philosophically 
fascinating role.   
So argues Claire Pagès in her recent Lyotard et l’aliénation. The 
publication of her text – an at times too-concise construction of the above 
interpretation – is overall a happy occasion. Since it is de rigeur in Lyotard 
scholarship to emphasize the astounding ruptures which punctuate his 
philosophical development, Pagès has contributed to a subtler and, to my 
mind, underappreciated task of Lyotard scholarship: the patient tracking of 
guiding conceptual threads through abundant and chaotic source material. 
Picking up the “fil rouge” of alienation, Pagès’s deft touch produces a 
version of Lyotard more complex and yet more unitary than is readily 
accepted. Readers of Lyotard should welcome her text as a worthy and 
highly informative contribution to the minor Lyotard renaissance which is 
currently underway on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Pagès follows the fortunes of the concept of alienation in Lyotard’s 
corpus chronologically, from the early phenomenological/Left-Marxist 
phase to the posthumous writings. She ably if briefly describes his militant 
engagement with the relatively spontaneist, Left-Marxist Socialisme ou 
barbarie and splinter group Pouvoir Ouvrier, both of which cleaved to a more 
or less classical notion of alienation as something to be overcome via 
socialist revolution. From here, Pagès goes on to track Lyotard’s increasingly 
troubled relation to the concept during the years of “drift” away from Marx 
and Marxist categories, which took place roughly from 1966 until the 
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paroxysmal (and aporetic) rejection of any and all critical categories by 1974. 
One area where Pagès could have expanded her account is with respect to 
Lyotard’s dispute with Althusser, as contained in “La place de l’aliénation 
dans le retournement marxiste.” She admits this to be Lyotard’s “texte le 
plus important sur le concept d’aliénation” (36) but devotes a relatively 
sparse eight pages to it. As Pagès correctly points out, Lyotard attempted 
therein to preserve alienation from the Althusserian critique by casting it not 
as a concept of the mature Marx’s theory, but rather as a deictic – an index of 
a possible alternative underneath the social given – thereby preserving it by 
de-Hegelianising it (for Hegel, by contrast, there is simply “nothing behind 
the curtain” [39]). Here we see glimmers of a position somewhere between 
Althusser’s structural theory of society on one hand and the comparatively 
naïve Hegelian-Marxist humanism of a Maximilien Rubel or a Sartre on the 
other.   
In following the subsequent drift from Lyotard’s rigorous defense to his 
uncompromising rejection, one of Pagès’s merits is to have rendered highly 
digestible the substance of Lyotard’s notoriously difficult philosophy of the 
figural – a type of alienation “sans dehors” (43) – as well as his radical 
critique of alienation (and, paradoxically, of critique itself), as contained in 
1974’s Économie libidinale. This she does in the main by comparing Lyotard’s 
“critique” of alienation with that of Jean Baudrillard. Both thinkers identify a 
kind of “naturalism” at the bottom of alienation and other critical Marxist 
concepts; that is, the fantasy of an original, organic body unsullied by 
alienation, a pure or true “region” from which to mount a critique of 
capitalist society. Whereas Baudrillard grounds his radical critique of 
political economy on symbolic exchange and “primitive” societies – 
precisely, on the fantasy of such a pure or true region – Lyotard attempts a 
thoroughgoing rejection of alienation by arguing that there are, in fact, no 
such regions (posing thereby the question, as Pagès is right to point out, of 
the critical alibi of Lyotard’s own discourse). Showing how close the two 
thinkers start off, and yet how ultimately divergent they travel with respect 
to alienation, not only sheds light on Lyotard’s aforementioned text, but also 
puts in context early texts of Baudrillard’s which are, to my mind, vastly 
more interesting than the later texts for which he has become widely 
popular.  
When Lyotard shifts registers to the “postmodern” and “post-
modernity” (a distinction which the author would have done well to have 
commented upon), the critique of the alienation of the individual gives way 
to a critique of modern discourses of the emancipation of humanity, or 
peoples, or collectives. The longed-for unified body of the naturalism implied 
by classical conceptions of alienation gives way to the longed-for unified 
community as an object of Lyotard’s critique. This puts him squarely at odds 
with the consensus-driven communicational philosophy of Habermas, 
Rorty, Honneth and others, as Pagès briefly but capably describes.  
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Finally, Pagès finds operant in the last Lyotard a non- or only quasi-
critical notion of an alienation which is both irremediable and constitutive, 
couched in childhood, the unconscious, and language itself. The subject is 
always outstripped and at odds with itself (e.g. spoken by language – 
“tributaire” (140) – rather than truly speaking it). It is noteworthy that 
throughout her reconstruction, Pagès never ceases to be critical of Lyotard 
where such is due. Her short conclusion states the necessity of retaining a 
critical notion of alienation, while generously recognizing the merits and 
partial salvageability of even Lyotard’s later uncritical permutations.   
In spite of the many and considerable merits of Lyotard et l’aliénation, I 
am left with two regrets, the first of which is fairly substantial. Despite her 
excellent grasp of the early and middle period Lyotard, Pagès engages 
virtually not at all with the later Lyotard’s writings on Kant, the postmodern 
sublime, and postmodern artistic practices. This she avows in a footnote 
(11n1), stating that the guiding thread of alienation does not square with 
these themes. I believe this to be false, and see here a lost opportunity to 
construct an even farther-reaching global interpretation of Lyotard than 
Pagès has done. Lyotard’s reading of the sublime is, to my mind, par 
excellence amenable to interpretation in terms of a constitutive and 
irremediable alienation, since it is the index of an impossible passage 
between two faculties – reason and imagination – which is felt as a 
vacillating, irremediable mixture of pleasure and pain. This accounts for 
why the later Lyotard constantly invokes the sublime alongside childhood, 
the unconscious, and language itself, precisely to the extent that it functions 
as an index of effectively the same basic alienation. His writings on artists 
from this period, notably Barnett Newman, offer additional grist for this 
interpretation; postmodern artistic practice such as Newman’s – for example 
his attempts to paint the present moment – may be cashed out in terms of 
presenting the un-presentable; more precisely, the sublime read in terms of 
constitutively alienated aesthetic products and gestures.    
Secondly, Pagès seems to miss something of the political raison d’être of 
Lyotard’s final figures of alienation. She notes that these are quasi-critical if 
not critical strictly speaking (e.g. there is a certain critical force in the 
contrast drawn between the alienated misery/promise of childhood and the 
colonizing impetus of technoscientific development). She does not, however, 
expand much upon this claim. Here again, I sense a missed opportunity. It 
has long been my view that what Pagès reads as figures of an irremediable, 
constitutive alienation serve a tactical political purpose in the later Lyotard. 
Wagering that technoscientific development has become hegemonic and the 
human itself nearly obsolete, Lyotard multiplies testimonies to the 
intractability or constitutive resistance of the human in the interests of an 
additive, formally negative, melancholic political strategy (parallels with 
Adorno being on this count rather striking). All that remains of politics for 
the later Lyotard is the production, collection and dissemination of 
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testimonies to Pagès’s constitutive alienation, so as to highlight noise or 
confusion in the system; but even then, this politics is deeply ambivalent. If 
the system of technoscientific development is what threatens the finitude 
and contingency of human thought, then evidence to the effect that the 
human is intrinsically troubled or recalcitrant may be deployed in the name 
of “its mutation or its defeat for the benefit of a better performing system.”1 
This accounts for Lyotard’s claim in The Inhuman that “the witness is a 
traitor.”2 Hence, Lyotard is laboring under considerable political stakes and 
in complex, ironical strategic and tactical parameters which Pagès ultimately 
does not explore. Such an exploration would help to put in better 
perspective the rather ironic fact that whereas the young Lyotard sought to 
overcome alienation via council communist practice, the later Lyotard sought 
to anchor his politics on an alienation that can never be overcome.  
In spite of what I have here identified as certain shortcomings or missed 
opportunities, it must be remembered that Pagès’s text is above all readable 
as a point of entry into Lyotard, and its concision is therefore on balance a 
virtue. Lyotard et l’aliénation remains an engaging and welcome text on a 
thinker whose time for critical reappraisal has come.  
Matthew R McLennan 
University of Ottawa/Carleton University 
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